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Abstract
While parents have long received guidance on how to raise children, a relatively new
element of this involves explicit references to infant brain development, drawing on brain
scans and neuroscientific knowledge. Sometimes called ‘brain-based parenting’, this has
been criticised from within sociological and policy circles alike. However, the engage-
ment of parents themselves with neuroscientific concepts is far less researched. Drawing
on 22 interviews with parents/carers of children (mostly aged 0–7) living in Scotland, this
article examines how they account for their (non-)use of concepts and understandings
relating to neuroscience. Three normative tropes were salient: information about chil-
dren’s processing speed, evidence about deprived Romanian orphans in the 1990s, and
ideas relating to whether or not children should ‘self-settle’ when falling asleep. We
interrogate how parents reflexively weigh and judge such understandings and ideas. In
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some cases, neuroscientific knowledge was enrolled by parents in ways that supported
biologically reductionist models of childhood agency. This reductionism commonly had
generative effects, enjoining new care practices and producing particular parent and
infant subjectivities. Notably, parents do not uncritically adopt or accept (sometimes
reductionist) neurobiological and/or psychological knowledge; rather, they reflect on
whether and when it is applicable to and relevant for raising their children. Thus, our
respondents draw on everyday epistemologies of parenting to negotiate brain-based
understandings of infant development and behaviour, and invest meaning in these in
ways that cannot be fully anticipated (or appreciated) within straightforward celebra-
tions or critiques of the content of parenting programmes drawing on neuropsycholo-
gical ideas.
Keywords
expertise, neuroscience, parenting, sociology, subjectivity
Introduction
While parents have since long received guidance on how to raise children, a relatively
new element of this involves explicit references to the development of infant brains
(Lowe, Lee, and Macvarish, 2015a, 2015b; Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe, 2014; Pickersgill,
2014). Emerging from the US in the early 1990s (Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe, 2014),
these ideas about children’s brain development – also known as ‘brain-based parenting’
(Hughes and Baylin, 2012) – are related to, and exacerbated by, what some refer to as a
culture of ‘intensive motherhood’ or ‘intensive parenting’. Sociological literature on this
issue has argued that in such discourses on intensive parenting, parents (and particularly
mothers) are seen as almost exclusively responsible for how their children grow up (see,
for example, Bell, McNaughton, and Salmon, 2009; Lee, 2008; Lupton, 2011; Romag-
noli and Wall, 2012; Thornton, 2011; Wall, 2010). These discourses are related to, and
sometimes seen as a continuation of, so-called ‘attachment-based parenting’. This draws
on psychological theories of maternal/infant attachment, and similarly argues for the
importance of secure and loving parent–child relationships in determining the future of
the child (Lee, Macvarish, and Lowe, 2014; Pickersgill, 2018). Scientised notions of
parenting have circulated widely, with a range of UK policy documents discussing
children’s (brain) development and often mentioning the adverse consequences of sub-
optimal parenting (Broer and Pickersgill, 2015b; Lowe, Lee, and Macvarish, 2015a,
2015b).
The assumptions and claims underlying ‘brain-based parenting’ are not uncontested,
either within academic writing (Lowe, Lee, and Macvarish, 2015a, 2015b; Macvarish,
Lee, and Lowe, 2014, 2015) or among policy and practice actors themselves (Broer and
Pickersgill, 2015a, 2015b). Critics commonly assert that the cultural traction of neu-
roscience makes ideas around ‘brain-based parenting’ compelling, with non-scientists in
particular deemed easily swayed by the iconography of brain scans (Weisberg et al.,
2008). As Lee, Macvarish, and Lowe (2014: 14) have reflected, family policies based on
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neuroscience constitute ‘an intensified focus on intimate interactions between the parent
and child (such as feeding, touch, speaking)’. They argue that these interactions are
regarded by governments as appropriate targets of intervention for an ever-larger pro-
portion of the population.
Alongside arguments about the allure of neuroscience within policy and practice,
criticisms also focus on the effects of parents’ use of brain-based ideas in the raising
of their children. For instance, some have asserted that ideas about parenting based on
neuroscience revolve around imposing middle-class values (and associated assumptions
about educational, financial, and temporal resources) on working-class families. These
include seeking to stimulate and maximise intellectual development and attainment as
early as possible (Perrier, 2013; Romagnoli and Wall, 2012). Relatedly, Featherstone,
Morris, and White (2014), for example, have argued that ideas about brain-based par-
enting increase the ability of social workers to remove children earlier and more fre-
quently from families, should children be considered to be at risk. Where researchers
have examined how parents engage with discourses of intensive or brain-based parent-
ing, they often find that parents do indeed engage with these discourses to a large extent.1
Drawing on semi-structured interviews, Wall (2004, 2010) has shown how Canadian
mothers try to adhere to enjoinders to optimise their children’s brain development, which
results in parents becoming stressed and anxious about using their time ‘productively’.
However, Romagnoli and Wall (2012) have also found resistance among parents to ideas
associated with brain-based parenting. This is because such discourses are deemed by
some to ask too much of parents in terms of the investment of time and energy, or
because of a more fundamental disagreement over the extent to which brain-based
parenting is actually beneficial for children.
In this article, we take cues from such work to investigate how parents negotiate
understandings about children’s brains. Following authors such as Beaulieu (2003) and
Derksen (2011), we argue that statements based on neuroscience can be considered
generative; that is, they play a role in the constitution of parental affects, subjectivities,
and care practices. Furthermore, to explore how ‘lay’ people respond to expertise/knowl-
edge that refers to them or is (argued to be) relevant for them, we engage with the
sociology of expertise. In doing so, we highlight how parents negotiate and sometimes
resist expert guidance and knowledge claims. We base our analysis on semi-structured
interviews with 22 parents/carers of (mostly) young children (generally aged from 0–7),
all living in Scotland.
Neuroscience and the self
While our analysis is a contemporary one, it speaks to a longer historical debate on how
humans think about themselves, and the extent to and ways in which (neuro)sciences
play a role in changing these understandings. This has, for instance, been discussed in a
recent special issue on the future of the history of the human sciences. Smith (2019), in
particular, makes an argument for allowing for multiple ways of understanding human-
ity, opposing biologically reductionistic accounts. We take seriously his call for more
empirical studies into how people other than scientists engage with neurosciences, and
whether they ‘understand . . . selfhood as brainhood and in what ways’ (ibid.: 12).
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Moreover, he argues that ‘the “history” in the history of the human sciences signals . . . a
commitment to keeping open discussion about being human, drawing . . . on the debates
that have gone on and continue to go on’ (ibid.: 16; emphasis in original). One way in
which this discussion can be kept open is to examine how lay people understand them-
selves and their social and somatic worlds. It is in this spirit that we investigate how
(parent and child) subjectivities come to be produced through particular (parenting)
practices, and analyse what this means for wider understandings of being human.
The relationship between expert recommendations and parenting practices has been
theorised and empirically examined extensively by historians (Mechling, 1975; Raftery,
1995; Wrigley, 1989). Both methodological and theoretical challenges have been docu-
mented and explored in relation to determining the extent to which recommendations
from experts are a reflection of parenting practices, an encouragement to change these, or
neither (Mechling, 1975). Given the long history of parenting recommendations and
ideas, our analysis also lays further empirical specificity on how parents engage with
scientific knowledge, and how parent and child subjectivities are produced through these
engagements.
A particularly productive angle for historical studies of parenting ideas is in relation
to theories of attachment. Raz (2014), for instance, has shown how two different theories
of maternal deprivation (as relating to attachment) and sensory deprivation co-aligned in
constructing what came to be seen as autism, and autism’s causes. Similarly, Harrington
(2016: 96) traces the history of ‘mother love’ in relation to both healthy development of
children now as well as ‘responsible citizenship’ down the line. She focuses on what has
been referred to as ‘schizophrenogenic mother[s]’, who in their physical and emotional
absence contributed to the emergence of schizophrenia in their children, and shows how
from the 1960s and 1970s, mothers came to ‘speak . . . in their own increasingly politi-
cized voices’ against this ‘mother blaming’, ‘invoking the alternative understanding of
schizophrenia as a disease of bad biochemistry instead’ (ibid.: 111). Moreover, historians
have shown how attachment has been appropriated to reinforce politically conservative
parenting projects in which mothers are predominantly responsible for raising children,
an individual responsibility going hand in hand with the notion that no extra resources
from the state are needed (Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon, 2015a). Of specific rele-
vance is a study by Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon (2015b) showing the specific
historical and political routes of attachment theories into current policy reports on ‘Early
Intervention’ (see, for instance, Allen, 2011; Allen and Smith, 2009), which draw on
neuroscientific knowledge to consolidate attachment ideas.
Through this article, we aim to build on these historical and sociological literatures in
order to offer an analysis of how parents today creatively and pragmatically use science,
and also judge the information based on its do-ability, value-laden-ness, and historicity
(with some research judged to be ‘out of date’ by our respondents). In what follows, we
initially outline our theoretical inspirations, before describing our methods. Thereafter,
our findings come in three subsections. First, we focus on a piece of brain-based infor-
mation relating to children’s processing speed. Second, we turn to accounts of the
so-called ‘Romanian orphans’: a collection of children who experienced extreme depri-
vation in Romanian state-run orphanages, with a range of neurodevelopmental conse-
quences (Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, 2014). Third, we document discussions around
88 History of the Human Sciences 33(5)
whether children should be left to cry, especially when they are going to sleep. In the
discussion, we reflect on our analysis, and in particular on how parents negotiate brain-
based ideas and understandings, and how children’s agency is constituted with and
through these negotiations. Our analysis, then, is relevant to explorations of how notions
about parenting, and in particular the contested ideas associated with brain-based par-
enting, are received, adapted, and rejected by parents themselves, and how parent and
infant subjectivities are produced in these processes. Hence, we speak to a longer his-
torical debate about how scientific notions are incorporated in ‘lay’ understandings and
practices.
Social studies of science, knowledge, and expertise
A key strand of literature that we draw on is work in the social studies of neuroscience. In
particular, we take inspiration from research demonstrating the productive nature of
brain images and the ways through which neuroscientific theories influence contempo-
rary ideas of the self. Historians and sociologists have argued that the brain has become
increasingly important to how people understand themselves, with neologisms like
‘brainhood’ (Vidal, 2009) and ‘neurochemical selves’ (Rose, 2007) invoked in such
considerations. The importance of neuroscience is often linked to, but also contrasted
with, knowledge from the psy-sciences, for example regarding the construction of cate-
gories like ‘depression’ (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). While neuroscience is often
criticised for being reductionist, Beaulieu (2003: 563) has argued that it can be analy-
tically more useful to consider investigations of the brain as semiotically generative: she
encourages sensitivity to how neuroscientific work ‘powerfully redefines concepts like
behaviour, nurture, culture and environment’. Gardner et al. (2018: 191) make a similar
argument when they suggest the importance of investigating ‘how [neurological] poten-
tials become culturally relevant’.
Work on the productive nature of neuroscience has some resonances with the scholar-
ship of philosopher Ian Hacking, who has written extensively about how people respond
to new categorisations and framings of subjects and their experiences (Hacking, 1999,
2007). In particular, we can see similarities in relation to the productivity of scientific
knowledge for how people think about themselves and their social lives (for instance, in
terms of the good, ‘attached’ mother, or the neurologically impoverished neglected
infant). Moreover, both Hacking and work on the productive nature of neuroscience are
indebted to Foucault’s thinking about the iterative relationship between knowledge and
subjectivity (Foucault, 1977, 1978). Here, we share such scholars’ interest in, as Derksen
(2011: 842) puts it, how ‘neuroscientific theories and classifications are sources of
identity that are not only adopted, but also adapted and sometimes resisted by the people
they apply to’.
We want to make links between this body of research and other research in the
sociology of expertise. This emphasises how ‘lay’ people respond to expertise/knowl-
edge that refers to them or is relevant for them. We find especially instructive work that
shows how individuals are reflexive agents who do not necessarily passively accept
scientific knowledge, but instead often critically reflect on, adjust, or reject expert
knowledge. Sociologist Brian Wynne’s (1992) research is commonly judged
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path-breaking in this regard; he detailed how and why sheep farmers in Cumbria in the
UK rejected knowledge about radioactivity (following an incident at a nearby nuclear
reactor) based on local epistemologies of practice. In the realm of health and medicine,
analysts of biomedicine and society have illustrated how responses to ostensibly novel
technoscience are assessed against experiential knowledge (see, for example,
Cunningham-Burley, 2006; Kerr and Cunningham-Burley, 2000; Kerr, Cunningham-
Burley, and Amos, 1998; Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Tutton, 2007a, 2007b;
Pickersgill, Martin, and Cunningham-Burley, 2015). Such work has illustrated how
understandings of the body authorised within some academic settings can be rejected
by other kinds of experts when they fail to align with pre-existing ontologies and
epistemologies.
Sociologists and other social scientists have further studied how family actors nego-
tiate parenting-related knowledge and expertise, with breastfeeding perhaps the most
studied example. As a range of analysts have indicated (see Knaak, 2010; Ryan, Bissell,
and Alexander, 2010; Wall, 2001), a strong moral discourse on ‘breast is best’ is publicly
available within many nations; yet this is also sometimes contested by individuals
targeted by it. Relatedly, what and how much children eat has been the subject of a
notable and ongoing public debate, with sociologists in turn exploring these and resonant
issues through accounts of parents’ responses to expert ideas about their children’s diet
(see Bell, McNaughton, and Salmon, 2009; Keenan and Stapleton, 2010; Lupton, 2011;
O’Key and Hugh-Jones, 2010). Murphy (2003: 433), for instance, studied mothers’
perspectives on child nutrition recommendations, elucidating various ‘rhetorical strate-
gies’ used by women ‘to defend themselves against the charges of maternal irresponsi-
bility that arise when their practices do not conform to expert medical
recommendations’. Work in this vein is important to our analysis, since it sensitises
us to the diverse responses that parents can have to ideas around brain-based parenting –
which may challenge assumptions about how these might be adopted or otherwise
engaged with.
Indeed, previous studies have indicated that different actors engage with neuroscien-
tific notions in diverse ways (Pickersgill, Cunningham-Burley, and Martin, 2011; Singh,
2013). Based on such studies, Gardner et al. (2018: 191) have suggested that it might be
productive to speak of ‘multiple neurosocialities’, where the ‘transformative effects [of
neuroscientific developments] depend on how they become immersed in local practices
by creative and pragmatic agents’ (ibid.: 190). Such literature, then, implicitly or expli-
citly connects ideas from the sociology of expertise with the sociology of neuroscience,
discussing the multiple strands constituting subjectivities, and, like Beaulieu’s and Derk-
sen’s work mentioned above, arguing against the presence of solely reductionistic mod-
els of neuroscience and practices of neuroscientists.
We build on this work by focusing on a case study in a parenting context, which,
except for parents of children with certain neurologic conditions (Borgelt et al., 2014;
Singh, 2005; Whiteley et al., 2017), has not frequently been the focus of studies in the
sociology of the neurosciences. Focusing on three specific ideas about the brain and
attachment that our respondents introduced in the interviews, we examine how a range of
neuropsychological notions were accounted for as supporting or generating certain par-
enting practices, and entailed the construction of particular kinds of infant capacities and
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subjectivities. Taking cues from the sociology of expertise, we show how parents reflex-
ively weigh and judge understandings and guidance. These adjudications underscore the
role of everyday epistemologies of parenting in terms of how the somatic salience of love
and care, as well as the neurobiological limits of agency, are constructed and understood.
Methods
The research underpinning this articled was part of a Leverhulme Trust–funded project
on ‘Neuroscience and Family Life: The Brain in Policy and Everyday Practice’ (funded
2013–15). A key study aim was to better understand how neuroscientific notions and
findings shape policy regarding, social services for, and personal experiences of parent-
ing. Among the data collected for the research were 22 semi-structured interviews with
parents and caregivers of young children in Scotland. Interviews covered respondents’
perspectives on raising their children, the information and suggestions they received, the
role of parenting programmes in disseminating these, and the place of the brain within
such ideas on parenting.
Interviewees were recruited through two parent programmes (explained in more
detail below), chosen as recruitment sites for pragmatic and theoretical reasons. Prag-
matically, we had previously conducted interviews with people involved in developing
and delivering these courses (see Broer and Pickersgill, 2015a), which helped to ensure
access. Theoretically, we knew neuroscience was discussed in these courses, and there-
fore that most of the respondents we would recruited would, in principle, be able to talk
about the import of understandings and ideas grounded in neuroscientific concepts and
findings for their parenting practices.
One of the aims of both of these programmes was to provide parents with confidence,
knowledge, and skills to bring up their children. Groups of parents (primarily mothers,
though not exclusively) participated in the programmes; within them, each session con-
sisted of a mixture of talks, videos, and discussion among parents. One of the pro-
grammes was delivered through primary schools as well as parenting support centres;
the other was convened by a UK children’s charity and located in parent or community
support centres. This diversity of locations also accounts for the relatively wide age
range of the participants’ children; some of the children were at the end of primary
school, whereas others were young babies. Parents encountered the former course
through a range of pathways; for instance, some participated via their child’s school,
while others took part as a consequence of their wider engagement with a community
service for fathers, families, or another group. Both programmes drew on neuroscience
and theories of attachment to enhance parents’ knowledge about infant development,
although the former did so somewhat more explicitly (and was the programme from
which the majority of our participants were recruited). Broer visited some of the centres
where the courses took place in order to make initial contact with parents, and to better
comprehend the contexts in which the programmes and respondents were situated.
The programmes targeted a range of people (including young mothers, fathers, and
parents with generally slightly older children and living in more affluent areas), and our
sample deliberately reflected this diversity. It included people from various backgrounds
who brought their children up in wide-ranging circumstances, such as with or without
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social work involvement, with or without the concern that their children might be
removed by the state, and with or without a partner. We asked our respondents if they
would like someone else (such as their own parents or another person closely involved in
the care of their child) to join them for the interview, in order to generate richer dialogue.
Interviews were generally conducted with a programme participant and, depending on
their situation and preferences, a grandparent of their child, their partner, a friend of the
family, or a support worker. Ten of the interviews included at least two participants,
often resulting in a paired interview format; 12 were conducted with a single partici-
pant. This, we suggest, reflected the challenges and isolation of some of the partici-
pants, in terms of social support. Three of the principal participants were fathers,
whereas in three other interviews the father was present as a second respondent. One
interview was conducted not with a parent, but with a main carer (specifically, the
grandfather of the child, of whom he had custody). In every other case, the principal
participant was a mother. All but two of the interviews took place at the home of the
principal participant; the remainder were conducted in local centres where the parent-
ing programme had taken place. Interviews usually lasted a little over an hour and were
all conducted by Broer.
A first detailed coding of the interviews was undertaken, after which codes were
grouped in the light of the questions we wished to interrogate for this paper; that is,
what pieces of neuroscience-based information resonated (or not) with parents, and how
these were spoken about. Three relevant topics were introduced by respondents in a large
number of the interviews (17 in total): children’s neuropsychological processing speed
(9 interviews); neglected Romanian orphans (10 interviews); and what to do with a
sleepy, crying infant (7 interviews). While some participants mentioned all three topics,
in five of the interviews none of them was (explicitly) discussed, although in two of these
neuroscience was mentioned more generally. In the next sections, we present and reflect
upon data regarding each of these tropes.
Results
The significance of speed
In this section, we examine how our study participants described learning about chil-
dren’s ‘processing speed’; that is, the time it takes between a stimulus and a child’s
response to it. To give a brief introduction to how this notion is discussed in child
development literature, psychologist Robert Kail (2000: 52) describes in one review
article that on ‘a wide range of motor, perceptual, and cognitive tasks in which partici-
pants must respond rapidly, a common pattern of age differences emerges: 8- to 10-year-
olds typically respond at a speed that is 5 to 6 standard deviation units below the average
speed for young adults’. Even adolescents, Kail argues, respond on average more slowly
than adults. Here, we analyse how parents made sense of information about processing
speed they encountered in the parenting programmes attended, including how the agency
of children was (re)positioned in and through our respondents’ engagements with this.
The notion of processing speed was often mentioned by our respondents when the
parenting programme was initially introduced within the interview, or following a
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prompt about the developing brain, such as in the following extract from an interview
with a father (Interview 18):
R: But I find that, that [programme leader], and that [organisation] have been absolutely
amazing and really helped me understand all of this, the side of child development and that
and how the brain works and everything like that; how a child’s brain works and that. . . . It’s
like telling your child you know something, it takes double the time for them to process
what you’ve asked them to do than it actually does for a normal adult to process it. So. . . .
I: Double the time?
R: Yeah. So like for example, telling them to put their shoes on, you have to wait a few
minutes for them to be able to understand it and for their brain to realise, ‘right, my mum or
my dad – or somebody – has asked me to do this, this is what I need to do, this is how I’m
going to do it, kind of thing;’ and for the brain to then tell them how to do it. Whereas you’re
normally within five minutes, or a couple of minutes, going, [change in tone] ‘I’ve already
told you to put your shoes on’.
I: Yes.
R: So you’re kind of having to remember that it’s because actually, it’s not because
they’re being disobedient or anything like that, or that they’re, you know, not being helpful
and that, it’s the fact that they actually maybe haven’t completely processed your request.
Similarly, the extract below comes from an interview with a mother (Interview 19) who
felt that information about children’s processing speed, and neurological development
more generally, enjoined her to recalibrate her parenting practices:
I: I heard that some of the courses also talk about children’s brain development.
R: Yes, fascinating!
I: Was it?
R: Because I can’t remember all of it now and I’ll have to read over it again. Like I say,
some of it I knew, but some of the stuff they’ve discovered over the last sort of 20 years was
amazing about the way that they [children] develop and stuff. And it just really helps you
understand where they’re coming from a lot more. You know you think okay, that’s why
they do that! That’s why they can’t get the gist of that, because they’re just not at the stage
where they can do that yet. Something about how their . . . they can take seven times longer
than an adult to respond, to process and respond to something that you’ve said to them; that
helped a lot. That stuck with me.
I: How did that help you?
R: Because you realise when you tell them to do something or you’re trying to get their
attention, especially when it’s time sensitive, like mornings, a stressy time of the day, and
they don’t respond. You don’t immediately go: argh! And say it again. I said this! And get
annoyed with them. Because they’ve just maybe not kind of processed it yet. They might
actually still be figuring out what you said and be ready to act or respond to you.
This participant added that ‘the more you find out about the brain the more astounded
you are at the way it actually functions’, and asserted that this new knowledge had helped
her to become more patient with and understanding of her children. As is apparent from
the preceding extract, ideas about neurological limits to children’s processing speed can
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serve to excise conflict from domestic interactions between parents and their children,
through reducing the agency parents regard children as expressing. Many of the com-
ments made by the mother in Interview 19 resonated with perspectives expressed by
other parents/carers, with this extract in particular illuminating how information about
the brain can be argued to act as a resource for impelling shifts in comprehending
children’s actions. However, the respondent above also appreciated knowledge about
things other than the brain: she argued that regardless of whether behaviour was under-
pinned by ‘something physical or mental or emotional or what have you’, it was a good
thing ‘to have that [behaviour] explained’ – with such explanations contributing to
enhanced understandings of her children. Hence, neuroscientific explanations for her
played an important role – but not necessarily the most important – in understanding and
interacting with her children.
Eight other parents likewise spoke about how, thanks to the parenting programmes,
they now knew that their children were not misbehaving or merely ignoring the adults in
their lives, but rather that it took longer for them to process information. One woman
(Interview 12) noted that such knowledge encouraged her to communicate differently
with her children:
Even if it sounds like you’re being a bit abrupt, it’s better just to give one task or ask them to
do one thing at a time, rather than overloading them, because it takes them longer to process
things. Seven seconds, I think they said, seven times longer, it takes their brain seven times
longer to understand what you’ve asked them. . . . So just be patient, don’t ask them again.
Just count to ten . . . give them time to understand it.
One parent (Interview 4), however, reflected that while notions of processing speed
enhanced her understanding of why children did not immediately respond to requests,
frustration nevertheless remained:
[The parenting programme] taught you about, just like why, like it would maybe tell you
why kids seem to be ignoring you when you’re speaking to them. Just that basically that
their brain is not . . . all the different tracks of their brain haven’t developed so it takes
something like seven times longer for a child to understand an order than it would an adult.
So, if you tell them to get their shoes on it would take a lot longer than if you told an adult.
An adult would click straight away and know exactly what you’re trying to tell them. Things
like that, that definitely made a huge difference, ‘cause it is quite frustrating sometimes
when you’re repeating yourself and it does feel that you’re being ignored. Obviously
knowing things like that, you know that it’s not just your kid, that if they’re not under-
standing straight away. . . . Most of the time I’ve got more patience for [son] knowing that he
is actually just trying to process what I’m saying rather than just ignoring me. Not all the
time. It’s still frustrating whether you know why they’re doing it or not.
Similar to the comments above, two mothers who took part together in the interview
(Interview 3) and who had both participated in a parenting programme said that even
though children’s brains might take longer to process information, this does not mean
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that children never ignore their elders. Consequently, parents need to take suggestions
about parenting ‘with a pinch of salt’:
R1: You’ll be like, ‘he’s bloody ignoring me’. But actually, they were nae [not] ignoring
you. They were just . . . it was processing it and every time you said it again, they were
processing it again, so it was taking them so much longer. So things like that. . . . But it’s all
very good on paper and it’s all very good to teach people this, but. . . .
R2: It’s totally different in life.
R1: . . . it’s totally different in life. . . . ‘Cause it says that, ‘oh when a child does this, like,
it’s not that they’re ignoring you’. And that’s fair enough, but there is going to be once in
that day when that child’s going to ignore you, so you can’t put it always down to the fact
that they’re just taking longer to process it. There is at least five times a day that [son] will
ignore me. And if I put it down to just the fact that, ‘oh he’s just taking longer to process it’,
he’d be walking all over me. Do you know what I mean, so it’s, like, taking everything they
say which is good and it’s great and it’s nice to be able to understand it, but it’s taking it all
with a pinch of salt . . . like, you need to decipher what’s . . . you need to pick your battles
really as well, like, kind of thing.
Hence, these respondents did not question the veracity of the neuroscientific claims
about processing speed, nor its relevance as such – but they did render problematic its
universal applicability. In effect, respondents drew upon epistemologies of everyday
parenting to suggest that judgements necessarily had to be made about childhood agency,
in order to ascertain whether or not one’s offspring were ‘really’ ignoring the requests of
the adults in their lives.
In this section, we have seen how knowledge about neurological function and devel-
opment, and about how children’s brains differ from those of adults, is accounted for by
parents as a resource that encourages them to feel more patient with their children, and in
some ways to expect less of them. Ideas about processing speed frame interactional
conflict as an epiphenomenon of a biological limitation, reconstructing children as less
intentional and ill-behaved in the process. While evidently (biologically) reductive, such
processes of neurologisation in the accounts of parents are also generative (see Beaulieu,
2003) in terms of how they propel new understandings of childhood development,
stimulate empathy regarding life course–related capacities, and shift parental practices
in response to novel knowledge. Moreover, reductionism can be selective and partial, as
parents exercise their own agency in applying neuroscientific ideas to their children in
ways that still leave considerable room for autonomy: children, it is argued, sometimes
do ignore their parents, regardless of the time taken to process the requests of their
caregivers. As a result, parents still have to decide when to reprimand, get annoyed,
or be patient; neuroscience does not (completely) solve the problem of agency and
disobedience.
The multiple lives of the Romanian orphans
The second brain-related story many respondents mentioned was associated with the
so-called ‘Romanian orphans’. After Nicolae Ceauşescu was overthrown in Romania in
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1989, it was discovered that ‘as many as 170,000 children’ were raised in state-run
institutions, and were often ‘poorly cared for’ (Nelson, Fox, and Zeanah, 2014: 12). The
orphans had not generally experienced the same exposure to sensorial stimuli as Roma-
nian (and many other) children typically did, and adults did not commonly interact with
them, or attend to even their most basic needs (ibid.: 2). A CT scan of the ‘extremely
neglected’ brains of the orphans – produced by researchers from the US Child Trauma
Academy in 2002 (Perry, 2002) – has come to circulate widely. For instance, a repro-
duction of the image featured on the title page of two key UK documents relating to early
years policy (Allen, 2011; Allen and Smith, 2009), juxtaposed with an image of a
‘normal’ brain. As a result, narratives built around the Romanian orphans have contrib-
uted to the establishment of early intervention programmes across the UK (Broer and
Pickersgill, 2015a, 2015b; Lee, Macvarish, and Lowe, 2014).
In 10 of the interviews, respondents mentioned the ‘true story’, as one father (Interview
18) referred to it, of the Romanian orphans. As we saw above, when telling tales of
processing speed, parents talked largely about how children processed information seven
times more slowly than adults, and used the example of putting on shoes, and getting ready
to leave the house more generally, to illustrate childhood processing lag. The story of the
Romanian orphans, though, was remembered in sometimes strikingly different ways, and
the lives of the orphans took on diverse fates across the interviews. Indeed, one participant
asserted to her friend that the children all died. Furthermore, while all the respondents who
brought up processing speed unanimously described this knowledge as helpful, the rele-
vance of neglected Romanian orphans to their lives was far more contested.
Some of the respondents who mentioned the Romanian orphans spoke of their growth
being ‘stunted’ as a result of a lack of interaction. Such talk extended the somatic
significance of love (including constitutive practices of care and attention) outwards
from the brain to the body as a whole, as in the following extract from an interview
with a mother (Interview 4):
Aye, they were never loved, they were never held or anything, and they never grew in size,
they never aged. Just like strange developmental things that you think just come no matter
what happens to you. But, yes they stayed small forever. . . . I think it showed you some that
were rescued and they were like 25 year old and they looked about five year old, like never
really grew or developed in any sort of way. Never learnt to speak obviously or feed
themselves, things like that. Obviously that’s an extreme case, but it just shows you like
if you’re not cuddling your child and nurturing your child and loving them, that it effects
loads of different aspects, rather than just their behaviour or whatever.
As another participant (Interview 11), who had recently trained to become a programme
facilitator, put it:
R: Yeah, sleep is important. Play is important, touch is important. Touch, if you don’t touch
your child, and you don’t cuddle your child, and interact with your child, it can stunt their
growth.
I: Oh really?
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R: There was a picture, which is quite haunting, and it was in a Romanian village, in a
Romanian orphanage. And there was children sitting at a table, and they looked about three
and four year old – they were 18, 19 year old. And they were just so tiny, it was. . . . But it’s
just, it’s a shocking image. You say, like throughout the whole session, it’s like how
important it is to physically touch and hold your child. Which is why breastfeeding is just
so publicised, it’s like, please just do it for the good of your child, and bonding wise. It’s, it’s
really haunting to see, in a group, and you say, how old do you reckon they are. And there’s
obviously a big boy there, so he’s a teenager, he’s maybe 20 years old, or something. And
he’s got a little person on his knee, and he’s sort of looking down, and that little person that’s
on his knee is, like, 18 years old.
I: Oh really?
R: And they can’t walk, ‘cause they’ve just been left, they can’t talk, they can’t do
anything. And again, it’s about their brain development, how the fight or flight affects them,
and stuff like that.
The final interview (Interview 22) we conducted was with a mother (R1) and father (R2)
of one child. The female participant had completed the parenting programme; both
respondents spoke of the emotive nature of some of the information it had offered:
I: So what kinds of things were emotional? . . .
R2: Didn’t you say there was some, was it a video, of some very deprived children or
quite older children or adults who looked like. . . .
R1: It was a still, it was a photo of, yeah, children, and the course leader had kind of said
how old do you think the children are? And I think most of us said five to maybe one of the
oldest ones was maybe eight, nine I think was the. . . . And it turned out they were something
like 15 to 20 or something. It was something horrendous. . . . I mean they were just physi-
cally . . . even if you thought you were maybe a year or two out you were. . . . This was really
quite shocking. I think it was a Romanian orphanage or something, some, some really quite
extreme kind of setting.
But I think that was a shock at just how bad it could be. But I think although that was very
distressing I think for me what was quite upsetting [teary voice] was that the woman . . . she
worked in the social work department, and she said, she made the point of saying don’t
dismiss that as being Romanian orphanage focused, that there, I think the stat she gave was
there’s one in three children in [city] right now who may not fall into as quite an extreme
category, but who would definitely be physically and emotionally deprived like that. And I
guess it’s that . . . I find that quite distressing. [teary] Just yeah, how unfair by luck of birth or
misfortunate of birth that yeah, those kinds of differences. . . .
This mother said that hearing about the orphans did not result in changes to how she
parented her son, not least because the course tutor asserted that she could ‘pretty
much guarantee that none of you in this room, none of your kids will be affected by
this directly’. However, the mother reflected that hearing about the Romanian
orphans might make her somewhat more understanding towards a ‘naughty child
at high school or the rough child’. She argued that schools, for instance, should not
punish a bully but instead support them, ‘because they can’t really be in a good
place if they’re behaving that way’.
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Most respondents said that the story of children in Romanian state orphanages did not
stimulate different parenting practices, since they gave their children love and affection
anyway. A grandfather recounted how he sang to his granddaughter (for whom he was a
key carer) on the bus, but that when he was a father he would have felt too ‘embarrassed’
to do so (Interview 13). Now, though, he could be ‘silly’ as that was what grandparents
were meant to be. When asked if he talked and sang more to the child after hearing about
the Romanian orphans and about the child brain absorbing information, he said:
I think it’s probably more with that because it gave me an awareness that when I’m speaking
to her, her brain is absorbing. I would say, it made me. . . . Although I still spoke to her it
made me more aware that what I was saying meant something to her and she could store it
and use it so, aye, I would say that definitely, but beforehand I would just tell her stories and
all the rest of it and not think anything of it but now when I’m telling her stories and things
like that I’m aware that it’s maybe making a difference and it is going in her head. That sort
of thing.
On a minority of occasions, however, interviewees indicated changes they had made
after the programme. For instance, a father (Interview 18) narrated the story of the
Romanian orphans and argued that it should be taught to ‘school age’ young people
in order to prepare them for having children and the responsibilities it entails. He asserted
that this cautionary tale would have been helpful for him had he heard it before becoming
a parent, because ‘when [oldest son] was born, I knew nothing about how to look after a
child or anything like that at all’. The respondent had participated in a parenting pro-
gramme following the birth of his second child, and spoke about differences in how he
interacted with his oldest son versus his youngest. This divergence was accounted for as
relating to the information he had received through the programme:
Because I knew how important it is, so I would have done a lot more. So I’m now doing that
with [youngest son], I know, now that I know how important it is I’m doing a lot more with
[youngest son]; I’m singing a lot with him, and talking with him all the time and that. Even
when I’m on the bus, just sitting on the bus, on a bus journey, I would never have one minute
with silence, I will always be communicating with [youngest son], or [oldest son] now;
whereas when [oldest son] was a child there maybe would have been times where maybe
ten, 15, 20 minutes would go past without any communication, you know. But now that I
know how important it is and everything like that, it is quite crucial.
Other participants were more critical about the place of Romanian orphans within
parenting programmes. One mother (Interview 20), for instance, described how much
of the content of the programme was ‘common sense’; when asked for an example, she
replied:
They were talking about emotional well-being and the importance of that. They talked
about, you know, development of the brain. . . . They wouldn’t go into loads of, sort of, you
know, the anatomy or anything like that, it was just talking about development, brain
importance, importance of having a bond with the babies, showing love, you know, things
that we all do. They talked a lot about, not a lot, they talked about children who are
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neglected. They talked about orphans in Romania or when the brain doesn’t develop
because babies are neglected and that wasn’t applicable to any of us there, you know.
We were all caring mums and I thought. . . . So there was that, you know, the brain doesn’t
develop as well. It was just more, hm, I can’t really remember, but there was nothing that
made me think, ‘oh, wow, wow, that’s new’ and it was, kind of, like just reinforcing what we
maybe already knew.
Another woman (Interview 9) was a critic of the parenting programme more broadly, and
suggested that it should be tailored to infant age and socio-economic circumstance. She
explained how the Romanian orphans featured in the programme, and referred to this as
‘out of date’. The respondent went on to describe her discomfort upon hearing of the
deprivation the children had experienced, as well as her unease regarding the effects of
this knowledge on the tenor of the programme:
R: I am very sad that there are children like that in this world. I wish there wasn’t, but I just
wasn’t entirely. . . . I don’t know, it was a bit kind of. . . . I mean it was quite an old photo-
graph and I just. . . . I don’t know, it made me feel a bit uncomfortable actually.
I: Why did it make you feel uncomfortable?
R: Well. Well, I didn’t want to say it, but I didn’t think it was actually relevant to the
course particularly. It was a bit too extreme. And then we had this whole discussion about
well, ‘isn’t it awful’, blah-blah-blah. And I just thought this isn’t why we’re here.
As she stated with humorous irony, this mother found the guidance relating to the
Romanian orphans and loving your child ‘very obvious, so obvious that even we were
managing to do it’. However, she argued that tales of the Romanian orphans and related
notions of interacting more with children might have been more useful for parents in
other socio-economic circumstances, who ‘were brought up differently’ and who had ‘no
example set for you, so you don’t know’ about the import of overt affection. Thus, even
though many parents did not talk about how information about neglected Romanian
infants directly impacted their own parenting practices, the narrative served as a resource
through which to craft dichotomous, class-based accounts of good versus bad (or ignor-
ant) parenting.
In this section, we have seen that some respondents saw the ‘extreme’ (Interviews 4,
9, and 22) case of infants in state-run Romanian orphanages as having relevance for
better understanding children and their needs. Yet other parents argued that it was
unnecessary (and perhaps even offensive) to narrate tales of now adult orphans from
post-dictatorship Romania within Scottish parenting programmes attended by ‘caring
mums’. Though the veracity of the information presented was not (generally) critiqued,
its relevance to the domestic lives of the respondents was reflexively judged and
weighted. Many asserted that the information did not impact their parenting practices,
arguing that they gave their children love and cuddles anyway. However, even they
sometimes concluded that tales of the Romanian orphans promoted better understanding
of children’s emotional and physical needs, and perhaps especially of other people’s
offspring. Furthermore, in one instance, other adults were suggested to be appropriate
beneficiaries of knowledge about affection and interaction, and in another case, a mother
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recounted the course tutor as suggesting this. In the process of presenting knowledge
about the Romanian orphans as relevant for others, then, dichotomies were introduced or
reinforced between ‘caring mums’ and others who (they considered) might not know
better because of their own childhood experiences.
Distress and development
In this final results section, we address ideas on infant sleep proffered in parenting
programmes, and in particular on whether or not to leave a baby to cry. In the literature
and elsewhere, this is widely referred to as infant ‘self-settling’ (Middlemiss, Yaure, and
Huey, 2015), with behavioural interventions in which a crying child is gradually left
alone for longer periods before being attended to described as ‘graduated extinction’ or
‘controlled crying’ (Honaker and Meltzer, 2014). Some researchers have argued that this
method is effective for reducing infant sleep problems; however, they also consider that
it can be emotionally challenging for parents (ibid.). Some developmental studies, draw-
ing on theories of attachment and elements of the neurosciences, assert that babies’
levels of cortisol (popularly known as a ‘stress hormone’) increase when distress is not
responded to (Philbrook and Teti, 2016).
In our research, some respondents discussed ideas about self-settling in relation to the
Romanian orphans discussed above, but generally it was treated separately. As one
woman (Interview 11) reflected:
There was a study done on children, to see when they were babies, you know like, how some
of them say leave them, leave them to cry themselves to sleep. That’s how it’s supposed to
be, and once they’re fed, and they’re changed, and they’re comfy, leave them. Another one
says, no you cuddle them, you soothe them, and you talk to them. The fight or flight
[response] in a child that’s been left is higher than the child that’s been soothed. Because
they know nothing else apart from crying, and crying doesn’t work, so they eventually stop
crying, which is quite sad.
Infant sleep was sometimes mentioned within more general talk around the importance
of demonstrably loving one’s child. One mother talked about giving her children love
and attention, saying ‘you can’t spoil a child with too much love’ (Interview 20). She
contrasted affect-laden interaction with what she described as ‘plonking’ a baby in front
of the television, asserting that a parent is ‘the best toy’ for babies in terms of stimulating
brain development. She went on as follows:
R: I think that’s important and that’s what the course taught me, as [well as being] a
midwife, the importance of that bonding, you know, controlled crying not necessarily is
a good thing, you know.
I: What is controlled crying?
R: Controlled crying is when you leave your baby to cry, you know, just letting it learn to
settle itself down by itself.
I: I see.
R: The brain is just so not developed and has to learn to feel safe and sometimes by
feeling safe, that’s how you can comfort yourself, not by crying yourself to sleep.
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In one interview (Interview 10), a respondent stated that ‘distress can destroy neural
pathways’, before correcting herself to instead note that distress was not ‘positive for the
development of a child’s brain’. This woman had slightly older children, and said that
when her eldest was a baby the guidance she encountered was to leave a baby to cry
rather than to co-sleep (that is, to sleep in the same bed as a young infant). Today, though,
an emphasis on infant attachment might result in quite different enjoinders:
R1: The course talks about attachment theories, which I thought was really interesting, and
looking back now I think we would have probably been more helpful to bring up my eldest
in a much stronger attachment theory style of parenting rather than expecting him you know
to settle himself and he’s in his room, we’re in our room, that kind of quite old. . . . I would
look back now and think God, that’s actually quite old fashioned.
I: So you would have done it differently.
R1: Yeah. I’d have had him in my bed, I’d have co-slept with him. I’d have, you
know. . . . Yeah, if I could turn the clock back, yeah, I’d do certain things differently. But
I wouldn’t, I got all the other stuff, I’m very happy with all the other stuff that I did, all the
interactions, and I spent loads of time with him, and that’s perfect, and that was lovely
memories.
We can see, then, that notions of attachment and neurological development can provide
sources of knowledge for parents to reframe past parenting practices as imperfect, and
potentially deterministic in leading to certain outcomes. At the same time, however, the
inability to change choices made months or years ago can serve to dilute the salience of
such knowledge: while the mother in Interview 10 described regret for not having
co-slept with her eldest son, she also asserted that co-sleeping would not have had a
significant impact on his personality:
But, yeah, just that little bit about his life, around sleep and settling, and I realise now that he
was probably, he was quite an anxious young child. We didn’t pick up his anxiety till a bit
later on in his life, and he does have anxiety. So that was interesting, but I haven’t given
myself a hard time about a lot of this, that perhaps if we’d have parented him differently he
wouldn’t have, he wouldn’t have had anxiety. But I don’t think that would have made a huge
difference.
Some parents spoke of how they listened to and heeded advice more carefully and
dutifully with their first child, but that they became more confident in their own expertise
with later children. Others described how the propensities of their children rendered
problematic the advice they had received. In the following extract (Interview 16), one
woman (R1, who had a young daughter) and her own mother (R2, who was heavily
involved in raising her granddaughter) talked about receiving advice that did not lead to
the changes in R1’s daughter that it was aimed at achieving:
R2: Sometimes the biggest teacher’s the child as well.
R1: Yeah. So . . . it is. With [daughter], you can have all this different advice from health
visitors, [parenting support organisation], even. . . . They mostly are all the same advice, but
you could have all the advice in the world, but the only person that’s going to really teach
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you is [daughter]. Because what their facts can tell you could be completely different for
[daughter].
I: Can you give an example of that?
R1: . . . [Daughter] used to be really bad for going to sleep. It’s not that she was bad, but if
she didn’t want to go to sleep, she would not go to sleep. And [family nurse] said to me,
‘right, you’re just going to have to ride her out. Let her cry. Let her scream. Let her tantrum.
Just leave her. As long as you’re going in and checking her to make sure that she’s
actually . . . she’s not crying because she’s hurt herself, she’s crying because she’s in a
tantrum’. Now I rode it out for two and half hours with her screaming and her tantrumming,
and all she needed was a cuddle to go back down to sleep again. Whereas [family nurse]
said, ‘no, just leave her to cry it out’. Whereas that might work with any other child, they’ll
cry themselves to sleep.
While most parents who talked about ideas around infant crying saw these as important
and/or relevant, there was one exception: a mother with primary school–aged children,
who of all the respondents was most critical about parenting programmes (Interview 9).
She argued that, in the interests of self-care, immediate attention to a crying infant was
not always achievable:
R: So lack of stimulus and then the brain kind of just switches off and goes right, well, we
won’t bother doing that any more. And that’s horrible.
I: Yes, I can imagine that’s quite depressing.
R: It’s really depressing, and then that led onto the picture of these poor children in the
Romanian orphanage which was. . . . But again, another example of something that was just
looking back. Fine, we all ignored our children for a little bit when they’ve been crying
because actually, frankly, we just have to have five minutes peace. But there’s nothing I can
do about it now.
Through the interview material presented above, we have shown that leaving a sleepy
child to cry was commonly, though not exclusively, presented by our respondents as
having neurologically and/or (psycho-)developmentally adverse consequences. Such
presentations highlight the somatic significance of deliberate acts of care, similar to the
tales of neglected Romanian orphans. We have evidenced how guidance relating to
crying children was accounted for by our participants as changing over time, including
during their own parental biographies, and how parents negotiated at times conflicting
ideas. Such negotiations included forms of narrative work through which caregivers
(re-)evaluated past and present parenting practices. Expert ideas and knowledge were
adopted, adapted, and rejected based on both their do-ability (Fujimura, 1987) and their
perceived applicability, underscoring again how everyday epistemologies of parenting,
including understandings of children’s personalities and agency, shape engagements
with other forms of knowledge.
Discussion
Drawing on 22 interviews with parents/carers of (mostly) young children, we have
examined how attendees of Scottish parenting programmes engage with ideas about
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infant neuropsychological development presented within these programmes. Significant
to many of our respondents was the concept of processing speed, and specifically the
notion that children’s brains process information seven times more slowly than those of
adults (and hence take longer to comprehend requests). Several parents/carers also
discussed hearing about Romanian infants who had been neglected in state orphanages
in the 1980s, and reported that these infants had consequently experienced considerable
(neuro)biological ramifications. Relatedly, respondents mentioned receiving advice
about whether or not to leave their baby to cry to sleep, with parents usually noting that
they had been encouraged to attend swiftly to their child since the infant might experi-
ence adverse neuroendocrinological effects. Understandings of childhood neurobiologi-
cal limits and the somatic significance of love were evident across many of the
interviews, with children’s subjectivities constituted, in part, through the functioning
of their brain. Accounts of concepts like processing speed commonly presented child-
hood agency as having biological limits. Moreover, neglected infants were constructed
as somatically different to those who had received parental love as expressed through
carefully modulated voice, touch, and gaze.
It was not only respondents who explicitly mentioned brain development or the
Romanian orphans that spoke about the need to interact with children. Often reflecting
the content of the parenting programmes they had attended, in every interview partici-
pants discussed things like ‘being there’ for their children, and verbally and physically
interacting with them. Examples of such interactive care included taking a child to the
kitchen so they could watch their parents cook, rather than ‘plonking’ them in front of a
television. This has resonance with Wall’s (2004, 2010) findings of US parents and
carers who seek to use every minute with their child ‘productively’. However, the
anxiety evident in the accounts of Wall’s interviewees was rarely explicit within the
talk of our respondents.
Within the reflections of those interviewees who did mention brain development,
neurologic subjectification was accounted for mostly as having positive consequences
for caregivers and their children; that is, it activated affects like empathy. For instance,
information about processing speed was described by some participants as encouraging
them to be more patient with their children. Narratives conveying the biological benefits
of attentive care (such as stories about the Romanian orphans or soothing one’s child
rather than leaving it to cry) were sometimes also advocated as prompts to interact more
with one’s children. Accordingly, many of our respondents experienced the brain-related
information encountered within parenting programmes as affectively generative (see
Beaulieu, 2003), expanding empathy and impelling renewed attention to care.
The facticity of the neuropsychological narratives presented to caregivers through
parenting programmes was rarely explicitly criticised; however, their relevance to the
respondents’ personal lives was subject to consideration and adjudication. In particular,
neurologic notions were related only partially to the participants’ own children, as
opposed to those of others. Moreover, participants’ talk also largely constructed children
as having autonomy in spite of some biological limits to agency. For instance, notwith-
standing children’s apparently slower processing speed, the respondents in one interview
noted that their offspring could and did deliberately ignore them – they were not simply
or solely processing parental commands more slowly. Accordingly, understandings
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based on neuropsychological knowledge could be reflexively rejected if they failed to
resonate with everyday epistemologies of parenting (see Romagnoli and Wall, 2012).
Indeed, some of the participants asserted that they received too much ‘advice’ from a
range of actors in their networks, usually unsolicited, and noted that these different
recommendations not uncommonly contradicted each other (reflecting, for instance, the
different contexts in which advice/research is produced). For example, some parent
respondents suggested that studies conducted in ‘extreme’ situations beyond the UK
were not relevant for their local parenting practices.
In addition to geographical variation, parents, through the parenting programmes in
which they had participated, engaged with science produced in different periods, such as
evidence produced in the 1990s, attachment-based parenting that draws on (but also
takes out of context, as Ramaekers and Suissa [2012] argue) the work of Bowlby (1969),
and slightly newer developmental studies on processing speed (Kail, 2000). Parents did
not usually construct the relevance of studies as a function of when they were conducted,
although on occasion they did reflect critically on what one mother termed ‘out of date’
research, construing this as carrying less salience for contemporary parenting.
When negotiating neuropsychological notions, and discussing care more broadly, our
participants also conveyed their understandings of what it meant to be a good parent.
Generally, this was not someone who necessarily sacrificed themselves completely for
their child, nor someone who focused all parental efforts exclusively on the optimisation
of infant neurological development. Rather, a good parent was someone who strove to
make ongoing physical and emotional contact with their children, in order to enhance
current and future well-being (part of which related to neuropsychology). Such a char-
acterisation is proximate to long-standing conceptions of (good) parents within British
civil society (Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon, 2015a, 2015b; Ramaekers and Suissa,
2012; Rose, 1998). In this respect, despite the biologised infant subjectivities we have
documented in our respondents’ accounts, the neuropsychological knowledge operatio-
nalised within parenting programmes might best be regarded as intensifying and subtly
shaping pre-existing tropes about how (best) to raise children, rather than as (necessarily)
radically reconfiguring caregiving. What is clear, however, is that neither fulsome cel-
ebrations nor outright criticism of programmes that offer parents resources for the
neuropsychological subjectification of children – their own or, especially, others’ – will
adequately engage the diverse meanings participants invest in the knowledge and narra-
tives they encounter therein.
Conclusion
By drawing on contemporary Scottish interview data, this article is intended to contrib-
ute to long-standing debates on how humans think about themselves, how they incorpo-
rate scientific knowledge into such understandings, and how they may also recast and
resist this knowledge as well. Child-rearing, which historically has been one of the
dominant topics on which people seek out (popular) scientific knowledge (Mandler,
2019; Mechling, 1975; Ramaekers and Suissa, 2012), is an important case study for
studying engagements with (neuro)science, and the extent to which, and ways in which,
these engagements produce novel subjectivities. This is an ongoing debate in, and for,
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the history of the human sciences, partly indebted to Foucault’s work on power, knowl-
edge, and subjectivity (Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon, 2015a, 2015b; Harrington,
2016). Critical scholars have argued that neuroscientific knowledge has more potential
to shape subjectivities because of its allure, even though enjoinders to parents that
interpolate neurological ideas have not necessarily changed so much compared to pre-
vious decades of parenting advice. Our analysis extends other empirical and conceptual
scholarship that describes the multiplicity of epistemologies and ontologies that form
contemporary subjectivities, within which the neurosciences are not, as a matter of
course, dominant but rather co-exist with and further complicate other ways of under-
standing what it means to be human (Gardner et al., 2018; Pickersgill, Cunningham-
Burley, and Martin, 2011; Pickersgill, Martin, and Cunningham-Burley, 2015; Singh,
2013; Smith, 2019).
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Note
1. Or rather, mothers, since most of these studies only ever investigate mothers’ attitudes –
thereby implicitly reinforcing an understanding of female parents as being ‘in charge’.
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